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3 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
Newark Cab Association, Newark Taxi Owner 
Association, Teterboro Airport Limousine Service, Abbas 
Abbas, Petro Abdelmessieh, Sayev Khellah, Michael W. 
Samuel, and George Tawfik (collectively, the “plaintiffs”) 
filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Jersey law 
challenging an agreement the City of Newark (the “City”) 
entered into with Uber Technologies Inc. (“Uber”).  They 
alleged, inter alia, that the City violated their rights under the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
subjecting Uber and other Transportation Network Companies 
(“TNCs”) to less onerous regulations than those imposed on 
taxi and limousine operators.  The City moved to dismiss 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The 
District Court granted the motion, and dismissed the action 
with prejudice.  This appeal followed.  The City’s decision to 
permit TNCs to operate subject to limited regulations places 
the plaintiffs in an undoubtedly difficult position.  However, 
the potentially unfair situation created by this decision cannot 
be remedied through the plaintiffs’ constitutional and state law 
claims.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court.  
 
I. 
 
  The plaintiffs are entities and individuals engaged in 
the licensed taxi and limousine industries in Newark, New 
Jersey.  The City has regulated all for-hire transportation 
providers, such as the plaintiffs, under uniform regulations set 
forth in the City’s municipal ordinances.  Newark, N.J., Rev. 
Gen. Ordinances (“Newark Ordinances”) §§ 34:1-1 to 34:2-24.  
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The regulations require taxi and limousine drivers, inter alia, 
to meet certain job qualifications, pass a background check 
conducted by the Newark Police Department, pay application 
fees, and obtain special commercial licenses.  Taxi and 
limousine vehicles must be serviced and inspected every six 
months by the Division of Taxicabs, taxi fares must be 
measured and imposed by meters in accordance with City-
mandated rates, and all taxi and limousine operators must carry 
primary commercial liability insurance.  Taxi operators must 
purchase and possess a taxi medallion to provide taxi services.  
Taxi drivers are likewise prohibited from working at Newark 
airport until one year after the issuance of their taxi driver’s 
license.  The City capped the number of taxi medallions in 
circulation at 600.   
 
In April 2016, Newark Mayor Ras Baraka announced 
an agreement between the City and Uber, under which Uber 
agreed to pay the City $1 million per year for 10 years and 
provide $1.5 million in liability insurance for each of its drivers 
in exchange for permission to operate in Newark (the 
“Agreement”).  Uber also agreed to have a nationally-
accredited third-party provider conduct background checks on 
all of its drivers.  Under the Agreement, Uber and its drivers 
are not required to possess taxi medallions and Uber is 
permitted to set its own rates and fares.  Nor are its drivers 
required to obtain commercial driver’s licenses.   
 
In August 2016, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against 
the City, bringing claims on behalf of a class of holders of taxi 
medallions and on behalf of a class of holders of limousine 
licenses who operate within Newark.  The plaintiffs advanced 
claims for:  (1) violations of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the 
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Fourteenth Amendment (Count 1); (2) violations of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Counts 2 and 
3); (3) violations of their substantive due process rights (Count 
4); (4) breach of contract under New Jersey law (Count 5); (5) 
promissory estoppel under New Jersey law (Count 6); and 
(6) equitable estoppel under New Jersey law (Count 7).  The 
City moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  The District Court dismissed the 
complaint.  The plaintiffs filed this timely appeal. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court’s grant of a motion 
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.  Fleisher v. 
Standard Ins., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  In doing so, 
we accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.  
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).  
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Fleisher, 679 F.3d at 120 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)). 
 
III. 
 
The plaintiffs raise several issues on appeal.  They first 
argue that the District Court erred by concluding that they had 
failed to allege a protectable property interest on which either 
their Takings Clause or substantive due process claims could 
be based.  They next argue that the District Court erred by 
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concluding that they failed to state a claim under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  The plaintiffs finally argue that the District 
Court erred in dismissing their state law breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel claims.  We have 
considered the plaintiffs’ arguments, and for the following 
reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order in all respects. 
 
A. 
 
 The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits the 
government from “taking private property for public use 
without providing just compensation.”  Am. Express Travel 
Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 370 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  It applies to state and local governments through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  To succeed on a takings 
claim, “the plaintiff[s] must first show that a legally cognizable 
property interest is affected by the Government’s action in 
question.”  Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 
428 (3d Cir. 2004); see also In re Trs. of Conneaut Lake Park, 
Inc., 855 F.3d 519, 526 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Without a legally 
cognizable property interest, [a plaintiff] has no cognizable 
takings claim.”).  Such property interests, in turn, “are created 
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as 
state law.”  Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 577 (1972).  Accordingly, we look to New Jersey law to 
determine the property interest at issue.   
 
 The plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred in 
determining that they have not been deprived of a legally 
cognizable property interest.  They contend that, under New 
Jersey law, they have a property interest in their taxi 
medallions that has been affected by the Agreement with Uber.  
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The plaintiffs argue that they have a property interest in both 
the value of the medallions as well as the “inherent value of the 
exclusivity of the taxi medallion.”  Plaintiffs’ Br. 30.  They 
maintain that they do not seek to exclude TNCs and other 
operators from the market, but instead seek to subject TNCs to 
the same regulations as taxi operators.  They also argue that the 
City created a tightly controlled market when it established the 
regulations governing taxis and capped the number of taxi 
medallions at 600.  As a result, the plaintiffs assert that the 
medallions have economic value that has been decreased by the 
City’s action in subjecting TNCs to less stringent regulation.   
 
The plaintiffs rely upon an unpublished state court 
decision, Mohamed-Ali v. City of Newark, No. A-4035-11T4, 
2013 WL 4859783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 13, 2013), 
in support of their position that they have a property interest in 
the value of taxi medallions under New Jersey law.  In 
Mohamed-Ali, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of 
New Jersey held that a “plaintiff had a property interest in his 
taxicab license.”  Id. at *3.  However, the court in Mohamed-
Ali did not hold that there was a property interest in the 
economic value of a taxi license.  There, the plaintiff was a taxi 
driver whose taxi license was suspended.  Id. at *1.  He argued 
that by suspending his license, the City deprived him of his 
property interest in the license without due process.  Id. at *2.  
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey 
held that the plaintiff had a property interest in his taxi license 
such that he was entitled to due process before it was 
suspended.  Id. at *3.  The court said nothing about whether 
this interest included the economic value of the license.  The 
plaintiffs have identified no other New Jersey authority 
indicating that the monetary value of a license constitutes a 
cognizable property interest.  As the Court of Appeals for the 
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Eighth Circuit held in considering a similar challenge, “a 
takings claim cannot be supported by asserting ownership in a 
property interest that is different and more expansive than the 
one actually possessed.”  Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., Inc. 
v. City of Minneapolis, 572 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Rogers Truck Line, Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 
108, 114 (1987)).  The plaintiffs have not shown that, under 
New Jersey law, their property interest in their taxi medallions 
extends to the economic value of those medallions.   
 
But even crediting the plaintiffs’ allegation that they 
have a legally cognizable property interest in the medallions 
themselves would not suffice to state a takings claim.  The 
plaintiffs remain in possession of their taxi medallions.  They 
remain able to use these medallions to conduct business.  The 
taxi medallions have not physically been taken from the 
plaintiffs.  Thus, the City’s actions have not deprived the 
plaintiffs of the possession or use of their taxi medallions.   
 
It is the economic value of the medallions that has 
changed as a result of the City’s actions.  The plaintiffs allege 
that before Uber began operating in Newark in 2013, the 
market value of a taxi medallion exceeded $500,000.  
Appendix (“App.”) 50.  They allege that by 2016, the market 
value of a taxi medallion had fallen below $220,000.  Id.  While 
unfortunate for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has “long 
established that mere diminution in the value of property, 
however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking.”  
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers 
Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993); see generally 
Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 
677 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a takings claim cannot succeed 
unless the government “deprived [the plaintiffs] of all 
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economically viable uses of the property”), abrogated on other 
grounds by United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Township of 
Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003).1   
 
That the market value of the taxi medallions derives 
from the City’s regulations does not change the analysis.  As 
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held, “[t]he 
general expectation of regulatory change is no less present 
where the value of the property interest is derived from the 
regulation itself.”  Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., 572 F.3d 
at 509; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1027-28 (1992) (“[I]n the case of personal property, by reason 
of the State’s traditionally high degree of control over 
commercial dealings, [a property owner] ought to be aware of 
the possibility that new regulation might even render his 
property economically worthless.”).  Therefore, the decrease in 
the market value of the taxi medallions is not sufficient to 
constitute a cognizable property interest necessary to state a 
claim under the Takings Clause.  
 
This conclusion finds further support in the fact that the 
City controls the number of taxi medallions in circulation and 
maintains the ability to flood the market with taxi medallions.  
According to the plaintiffs, the market value of the taxi 
medallions is derived from the fact that the number of taxi 
                                              
1 Relatedly, we have noted that a taking cannot be 
“established simply by showing the denial of ‘the ability to 
exploit a property interest that [the plaintiffs] heretofore had 
believed was available.’”  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. 
Duncan, 771 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1985) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978)).   
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medallions in circulation is capped at 600.  Even in the absence 
of the Agreement with Uber and other TNCs, if the City were 
to increase the supply of medallions by raising or removing the 
cap, the value of each individual medallion would decrease due 
to the increased supply of medallions.     
 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached this 
conclusion when confronted with a challenge to a Minneapolis 
ordinance that removed the limit on the number of transferable 
taxi licenses that were distributed by the city.  Minneapolis 
Taxi Owners Coal., 572 F.3d at 508.  There, because the 
ordinance neither revoked the existing licenses nor destroyed 
the ability of the license holders to use their licenses to do 
business, the court determined that “[t]he elimination of the 
market value of the taxicab licenses, however, can be 
considered a taking under the Fifth Amendment only if there is 
a protected property interest in that market value.”  Id. at 507.  
Looking to Minnesota law, the court determined that “[t]he 
taxicab licenses themselves do not carry an inherent property 
interest guaranteeing the economic benefits of using the 
taxicab license.”  Id. at 508.   
 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that because 
the market value of the licenses was created by the city when 
it initially capped the number of licenses made available, the 
property interest in the license extended to the value of using 
that license in the limited market.  It held that the plaintiffs’ 
claims failed because “any property interest that the taxicab-
license holders’ may possess does not extend to the market 
value of the taxicab licenses derived through the closed nature 
of the City’s taxicab market.”  Id. at 509.  It further observed 
that the Minneapolis taxicab market was highly regulated, 
which came with an “understanding that the license to participate 
 
 
11 
in the highly regulated taxicab market is subject to regulatory 
change.”  Id.  The court based this determination in part on the 
fact that “the City retained the discretion to alter the number of 
licenses.”  Id.  This reasoning also supports our holding here. 
 
 Finally, the plaintiffs have provided no authority in 
support of their position that their taxi medallions include a 
right to be the exclusive providers of transportation services in 
Newark, or that this right constitutes a separate cognizable 
property interest that can be the subject of a Takings Clause 
claim.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “a 
mere unilateral expectation . . . is not a property interest entitled 
to protection.”  Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. 
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).  The Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit has observed in considering a similar 
challenge to the one before us, “[t]axi medallions authorize the 
owners to own and operate taxis, not to exclude competing 
transportation services.”  Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n v. City of 
Chicago, 839 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied 137 
S. Ct. 1829 (2017).  That court determined that such a right to 
exclusivity was not a core property right that existed in the 
medallions absent a state law explicitly creating a property 
interest in that right.  Id.  We agree.  Although the holder of a 
taxi medallion has the right to exclude others from the use of 
that medallion, he or she cannot prevent others from possessing 
their own medallions, acquiring additional medallions, or 
creating a competing business.  See Checker Cab Operators, 
Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, No. 17-11955, ___ F.3d ___, 2018 
WL 3721227, at *7 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018) (“The [taxicab 
m]edallion [h]olders may exclude others from possessing, 
using, or disposing of their medallions.  But the ‘right to 
exclude’ does not sanction the creation of a market 
stranglehold.”); Bos. Taxi Owners Ass’n v. City of Boston, 180 
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F. Supp. 3d 108, 121 (D. Mass. 2016) (“[W]hatever property 
rights plaintiffs may possess in their medallions, those rights 
do not encompass a right to exclude others from the 
transportation-for-hire marketplace.  For that reason, plaintiffs 
have failed to allege a taking of their property.”).  A right to 
exclude others from competition is not found in the City 
regulations governing taxis.  For example, the holders of taxi 
medallions have no right to take legal action against someone 
who operates a taxi without possessing a medallion.  The City’s 
taxi regulations make it unlawful for those without a license to 
operate a taxi business, but do not give taxi medallion holders 
a private right to enforce these provisions.  See Newark 
Ordinances §§ 34:1-3 & 34:1-21.  Under the City’s ordinances, 
only the City has that power.     
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Illinois Transportation Trade Ass’n, further supports our 
conclusion.  There, the court analyzed the constitutionality of 
Chicago’s ordinance regulating TNCs.  The court observed that 
“[a] variant of such a claim would have merit had the City 
confiscated taxi medallions, which are the licenses that 
authorize the use of an automobile as a taxi.  Confiscation of 
the medallions would amount to confiscation of the taxis:  no 
medallion, no right to own a taxi.”  839 F.3d at 596.  However, 
the court held that because the plaintiffs remained in 
possession of their taxi medallions, their Takings Clause claim 
failed as they had not identified a property interest that had 
been taken.  Id. at 597.  The court held that Chicago had 
“created a property right in taxi medallions; [but] it ha[d] not 
created a property right in all commercial transportation of 
persons by automobile in Chicago.”  Id.  
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The plaintiffs do not have a legally cognizable property 
interest in the value of their taxi medallions or in the right to 
be the exclusive provider of ride-for-hire services in Newark.  
Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed their claim 
under the Takings Clause.   
 
B. 
 
The plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim fails for 
the similar reason that they have not identified a protected 
property interest that meets a threshold for such a claim.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.  Substantive due 
process is a “component of the [Fourteenth Amendment] that 
protects individual liberty against ‘certain government actions 
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 
them.’”  Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 
(1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 
(1986)).  We have recognized that “two very different threads” 
make up “the fabric of substantive due process”:  substantive 
due process relating to legislative action and substantive due 
process relating to non-legislative action.  Nicholas v. Pa. State 
Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2000).  The plaintiffs’ 
substantive due process claim is of the second variety.   
 
The “threshold” to establishing a non-legislative 
substantive due process claim is that a plaintiff “has a protected 
property interest to which the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process protection applies.”  Id. at 140 (quoting Woodwind 
Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000), 
abrogated on other grounds by United Artists, 316 F.3d 392).  
This requires a showing that the property interest is of a 
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“particular quality” that is not determined by state law.  Id. 
(quoting DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 
600 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by United 
Artists, 316 F.3d 392).  Instead, this particular quality “depends 
on whether that interest is ‘fundamental’ under the United 
States Constitution.”  Id.  Courts have been generally reluctant 
to expand the scope of substantive due process protection.  See 
Collins, 503 U.S. at 125.  Accordingly, the only protected 
property interests we have thus far deemed fundamental 
involved ownership of real property.  Nicholas, 227 F.3d at 141.  
 
We hold that the plaintiffs’ alleged protected property 
interests — the loss of value of their medallions and the right 
to be the exclusive provider of ride-for-hire services in Newark 
— do not meet the standard of fundamental property interests 
under the Constitution.  This conclusion is unsurprising 
because the plaintiffs similarly failed to establish a protected 
property interest under the less-exacting standard of the 
Takings Clause.  The property interest proffered to meet the 
substantive due process threshold here is akin to those we have 
previously rejected, such as the “ability to earn a living” and 
being terminated from a public job, Hill v. Borough of 
Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 n.12 (3d Cir. 2006), being 
actively prevented from winning city contracts in violation of 
a consent decree with the city, Indep. Enters. v. Pittsburgh 
Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1179-80 (3d Cir. 1997), 
and losing contracts because a plaintiff was termed a “crook” 
by a government employee, Boyanowski v. Capital Area 
Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 401-04 (3d Cir. 2000).  As a 
result, the District Court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs’ 
substantive due process claim. 
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C. 
 
The plaintiffs next argue that the District Court erred in 
dismissing their Equal Protection claims.  We do not agree. 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
admonishes that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. Const. 
amend XIV, § 1.  The plaintiffs press a “class of one” theory 
of equal protection jurisprudence.  See Village of Willowbrook 
v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (per curiam).  To state 
a claim under a class of one theory, “a plaintiff must allege that 
(1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly 
situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there 
was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”  Hill, 455 
F.3d at 239.   
 
Rational basis review is a very deferential standard.  It 
is met “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that 
could provide a rational basis” for the differing treatment.  
United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 77 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).  We have 
held that “the principles of equal protection are satisfied ‘so 
long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, 
the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently 
based rationally may have been considered to be true by the 
governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the 
classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the 
distinction arbitrary or irrational.’”  Id. (quoting Fitzgerald v. 
Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107 (2003)).  The 
Supreme Court has emphasized that “rational-basis review in 
equal protection analysis ‘is not a license for courts to judge 
the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.’”  Heller, 
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509 U.S. at 319 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 
U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the City’s justifications for 
permitting TNCs to operate in Newark under a different set of 
regulations than those that apply to taxi companies are arbitrary 
and irrational.  They insist that there are no real differences 
between taxis and TNCs, and that the differences identified by 
the City and articulated by other courts are illusory.  The City 
responds that it has legitimate reasons for treating taxi 
operators and TNCs differently that are sufficient to survive 
rational basis review.  The City contends that the salient 
differences between taxis and TNCs are that:  (1) users enter 
into a contract with TNCs before using the service and have 
access to significant information about their driver before 
stepping into the car; (2) taxis can be hailed on the street 
whereas a TNC must be summoned using a digital application; 
and (3) taxi fares are prescribed by City regulations.   
 
The most significant difference between taxis and TNCs 
is that customers can arrange a ride with a taxi by hailing one 
on the street, whereas to arrange a ride with a TNC, a customer 
must request one through a digital application.  After being 
matched with a driver, the customer is provided with 
information about that driver, including the driver’s name and 
photograph, the make and model of the car, and its license plate 
number.  App. 60-62, 96.  The customer also receives the fare 
rate and an estimation of the total fare.  App. 60-62.  This 
information is provided to the customer pursuant to the 
contractual relationship that he or she entered into with the 
TNC when setting up an account with the TNC.  See App. 96.  
A customer obtains all of this information before he or she 
enters a vehicle.  In contrast, a customer who hails a taxi on the 
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street may be able to observe the make and model of the 
vehicle, but does not know the driver’s identity before he or 
she enters the vehicle.  A customer who hails a taxi on the street 
knows what the fare rate will be because the metered fare is set 
by City regulation.  In the absence of a set fare rate, the 
customer would have no way of knowing the fare rate until he 
or she entered the vehicle. 
 
It is rational for the City to determine that customers 
require greater protections before accepting a ride from a taxi 
that they hail on the street than before accepting a ride from a 
TNC where they are given the relevant information in advance.  
A customer can immediately obtain a fare estimate from various 
TNC companies through the digital applications on his or her 
phone, and comparison shop among those companies before 
requesting a ride to ensure that he or she receives a fair price.  
In contrast, customers do not have this same level of information 
available to them before hailing a taxi ride.  In the absence of 
City regulation setting the fare rate, it would not be practical 
for a customer hailing a ride on the street to comparison shop 
among several taxi companies, as that would entail hailing 
multiple taxis and inquiring about the price.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable for the City to set the fare rate for taxis, but not for 
TNCs, to ensure that customers receive consistent pricing. 
 
The City’s regulations setting more stringent driver 
qualification standards and requiring certain vehicle safety 
features for taxis also function to provide greater protections to 
customers hailing a taxi on the street than when accepting a 
pre-arranged ride with a TNC.  Although customers might 
benefit if TNCs were also subject to these same regulations, 
the City could rationally conclude that these requirements are 
necessary to protect customers who hail a taxi on the street and 
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have no other protections, but not for customers of TNCs, since 
they have some degree of protection due to their preexisting 
contractual relationship with the TNC.  Accordingly, “it makes 
sense therefore for the City to try to protect passengers by 
screening the taxi drivers to assure that they’re competent and 
by imposing a uniform system of rates based on time or 
distance or both.”  Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n, 839 F.3d at 598.  
Thus, the City’s position that stricter regulations are required 
to protect taxi customers is at least rationally related to the 
City’s interest in providing safe access to transportation. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that these justifications do not 
constitute a rational basis for different treatment because there 
is no real difference between hailing a cab and requesting a TNC 
through a digital application.  When requesting a ride on a digital 
application, a customer does not select between drivers, but 
instead is matched with a driver by the application.  In this 
situation the customer has the same degree of choice about the 
identity of the driver and vehicle as he or she does when hailing 
a cab on the street with a raise of the hand.  At the moment the 
ride is requested, the same information is available to the customer.   
 
Even so, there are still differences between the two 
processes.  When requesting a ride from a TNC, the customer 
is matched with a driver a few minutes before the vehicle 
arrives, whereas a taxi customer immediately is matched with 
a taxi when that taxi pulls over.  These few minutes give the 
customer time to consider the available information before 
entering a vehicle, which is time that a taxi customer might not 
have.  A customer can use this extra time to cancel a requested 
ride.  Although a customer who hails a taxi can cancel that 
request by not entering the taxi, that customer has less time to 
make that decision than does a TNC customer.  Under the 
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highly deferential standard of rational basis review, the City 
could reasonably conclude that this is a sufficient distinction in 
customer experience to warrant stricter regulation of taxis. 
 
Finally, relying on the opinion of the district court in 
Boston Taxi Owners Ass’n, the plaintiffs contend that because 
the identified differences between taxis and TNCs result from 
the City’s regulation of taxis and not TNCs, the City cannot rely 
on those differences as its rational basis for the disparate 
regulatory schemes.  See 180 F. Supp. 3d at 118 (“The City may 
not treat the two groups unequally and then argue that the results 
of that unequal treatment render the two groups dissimilarly 
situated and, consequently, not subject to equal protection analysis.  
Such circular logic is unavailing.”).  The plaintiffs point out the 
fact that taxis’ fares are set by the City’s regulations, while the 
TNCs’ fares are not.  Similarly, they contend that the City 
regulates the qualifications of taxi drivers and the background 
checks that they must undergo, while TNCs are responsible for 
handling these and similar matters on their own.  
 
The Equal Protection Clause does not prevent the City 
from setting up a multi-tiered regulatory regime, as long as it 
has a rational basis for the distinctions it creates.  That is what 
the City has done here.  Taxi companies and TNCs each provide 
for-hire transportation services.  Each is subject to some degree 
of regulation.  A customer can pre-arrange a ride with either 
service, through the use of a digital application for TNCs or a 
telephone call for taxis.  However, taxis are permitted an 
additional privilege that is not available to TNCs:  the power 
to accept customers by way of street hails.  As a result, taxis 
are subject to stricter regulatory control.  These heightened 
regulations, as previously discussed, relate to the exclusive 
ability of a taxi to accept a street hail.   
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It is not irrational for a city to create a system in which a 
more tightly regulated service (here, taxis) enjoys additional 
privileges — the ability to obtain customers by way of street 
hails — that are not available to the less regulated alternative 
(here, TNCs).  To be sure, because the City here did not create 
this tiered system from its inception but instead permitted TNCs 
to operate at a much later time than the less-regulated 
alternative, its justification for not subjecting them to the same 
regulatory requirements as taxis may appear to be unfair.   
 
Street hails are not part of the business model of TNCs.  
Thus, by setting street hails as the benchmark for heightened 
regulation, it gives the impression that the City has permitted 
TNCs to escape the regulations imposed on taxis, and to 
provide a very similar service, without a substantial impact on 
their business operations.  The City’s actions in permitting 
TNCs to operate essentially comparable services with lower 
regulatory compliance costs may appear unfair to those who 
operate taxis and have relied on the existence of the regulatory 
framework in investing in their taxi businesses.  Although we 
recognize the difficult position in which the plaintiffs are 
placed by the City’s decision to permit TNCs to operate subject 
to limited regulations, an Equal Protection Clause claim is not 
the proper avenue to address this unfairness.  And while 
protecting reliance interests can be considered a rational basis 
behind government action, the plaintiffs have provided no 
authority for the position that a choice not to protect reliance 
interests would be irrational and constitute a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Cf. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 
13 (1992) (“This Court previously has acknowledged that 
classifications serving to protect legitimate expectation and 
reliance interests do not deny equal protection of the laws.”).  
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Because there are rational reasons for the City’s choice to draw 
the regulatory line at the ability to accept a street hail, this 
distinction is sufficient to satisfy the principles of equal 
protection.  Walker, 473 F.3d at 77.2 
 
Other courts that have considered similar challenges 
under the Equal Protection Clause are in accord with our 
conclusion.  In Illinois Transportation Trade Ass’n, the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined what it viewed as the 
differences between TNCs and taxis and concluded that these 
                                              
2 The City also argues that the plaintiffs’ claims are 
“precluded” by the Transportation Network Company Safety and 
Regulatory Act (the “TNCSRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:5H-1, et 
seq.  City Br. 19 n.2.  The City contends that the TNCSRA 
precludes the plaintiffs from obtaining the relief they seek 
through their complaint, as it prevents the City from subjecting 
TNCs to additional regulations.  Id.  The TNCSRA, which 
became effective on May 1, 2017, regulates TNCs within New 
Jersey.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:5H-1-3.  The TNCSRA gives the 
state the power to issue permits to TNCs, which allows them 
to operate within the state, provided that they meet certain 
requirements laid out in the statute.  Id. § 39:5H-4.   
 
Through this action, the plaintiffs have not brought a 
challenge to the TNCSRA.  The effect, if any, that the 
TNCSRA has on this case has not been fully briefed.  The 
parties at oral argument each took the position that the 
TNCSRA does not prevent this Court from reaching the merits 
of the issues raised on this appeal.  Because the plaintiffs’ 
claims fail for the aforementioned reasons, we need not 
determine what effect, if any, the TNCSRA has on the 
plaintiffs’ requested relief. 
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differences justified the City’s disparate treatment of the two.  
839 F.3d at 598.  The court identified the following differences:  
(1) customers can hail a cab, but must create a contractual 
relationship with a TNC before requesting a driver via a digital 
application; (2) TNCs “assume[] primary responsibility for 
screening potential drivers” before hiring them, taxi services do 
not; (3) customers “receive more information in advance about 
their prospective rides” from TNCs, including “not only the 
driver’s name but also pictures of him (or her) and of the car”; 
and (4) TNCs employ part time drivers who are believed to “drive 
their cars fewer miles on average than taxicab drivers, who are 
constantly patrolling the streets in hope of being hailed,” which 
means that their vehicles are “less likely . . . to experience wear 
and tear that may impair the comfort of a ride in [them] and even 
increase the risk of an accident or a breakdown.”  Id.  The court 
reasoned that these differences were rational because 
 
[t]axis but not [TNCs] are permitted to take on as 
passengers persons who hail them on the street.  
Rarely will the passenger have a prior relationship 
with the driver, and often not with the taxicab 
company either; and it makes sense therefore for 
the City to try to protect passengers by screening 
the taxi drivers to assure that they’re competent 
and by imposing a uniform system of rates based 
on time or distance or both. 
 
Id.;3 see also Checker Cab Operators, ___ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 
3721227, at *12 (“[T]he[] equal protection claims fail because 
                                              
3 Numerous district courts have found that these 
differences constitute a rational basis sufficient to overcome 
similar Equal Protection Clause challenges brought by taxi 
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any disparate regulatory treatment that the County afforded 
taxicabs and [TNCs] was amply supported by legitimate 
government interests.”).  
 
In sum, the City had a rational basis for treating TNCs and 
taxi operators differently.  These differences also demonstrate 
that TNCs and taxi operators are not similarly situated for purposes 
of their “class of one” claims.  See Progressive Credit Union v. 
City of New York, 889 F.3d 40, 51 (2d Cir. 2018) (“We conclude 
these differences mean that medallion taxicabs and [for-hire 
vehicles] are not prima facie identical for ‘class of one’ purposes 
and that they provide a rational basis for the different regulatory 
treatment applied to each group.”).  The plaintiffs, therefore, 
cannot succeed on their class of one equal protection claims and 
the District Court did not err in dismissing these claims.   
 
D. 
 
  Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the District Court 
erred in dismissing their claims for breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel under New Jersey 
law on the grounds that City regulations making taxi drivers 
the exclusive providers of ride-for-hire services in Newark 
constituted a contract or a promise to them that the City 
breached when it entered the Agreement with Uber.  We do not 
agree and will affirm dismissal of the plaintiffs’ state law claims. 
                                              
companies.  See, e.g., Miadeco Corp. v. Miami-Dade County, 
249 F. Supp. 3d 1296, 1303-04 (S.D. Fla. 2017); Melrose Credit 
Union v. City of New York, 247 F. Supp. 3d 356, 368-69 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017); Desoto Cab Co. v. Picker, 228 F. Supp. 3d 
950, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Gebresalassie v. District of 
Columbia, 170 F. Supp. 3d 52, 61-62 (D.D.C. 2016). 
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1. 
 
Under New Jersey law, “[t]o state a claim for breach of 
contract, [a plaintiff] must allege (1) a contract between the 
parties; (2) a breach of that contract; (3) damages flowing 
therefrom; and (4) that the party stating the claim performed its 
own contractual obligations.”  Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 
F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).  In New Jersey, “a statute may 
be construed as creating a contract when the Legislature’s 
intent to create a contractual commitment is ‘so plainly 
expressed that one cannot doubt the individual legislator 
understood and intended it.’”  Burgos v. State, 118 A.3d 270, 
282 (N.J. 2015) (quoting Spina v. Consol. Police & Firemen’s 
Pension Fund Comm’n, 197 A.2d 169, 176 (N.J. 1964)).  In 
such a situation, “clarity of language is necessary if a statute is 
to be regarded as having been intended to create contractual 
rights.”  Id. 
 
We are not convinced that the City intended to create 
contractual rights through its regulation of taxi services.  The 
plaintiffs argue that the City’s intent to create a contract can be 
found in the Newark Ordinances (1) requiring taxi operators to be 
licensed,4 (2) outlawing taxis licensed in other municipalities 
                                              
4 Newark Ordinances § 34:1-3 provides: 
 
No person shall operate or permit a taxicab 
owned or controlled by him/her to operate as a 
taxicab upon the streets of the City of Newark 
without first having obtained a taxicab license 
and/or a license renewal from the Manager, after 
review by the Taxicab Commission.  
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from operating within Newark without a license,5 (3) placing 
                                              
It shall be unlawful or a violation of this 
chapter for taxicabs licensed in other 
municipalities or states to receive passengers in 
the City of Newark and regularly discharging 
passengers originating in other municipalities or 
states in the City of Newark without obtaining a 
licensed from the Manager, Office of Taxicabs. 
 
5 Newark Ordinances § 34:1-7 provides: 
 
No taxicab license may be sold, assigned or 
otherwise transferred without the consent of the 
Manager upon recommendation of the Taxicab 
Commission.  A license may be transferred to 
another person to be used in a bona fide operation 
of a taxicab business, with the consent of the 
Manager upon recommendation of the Taxicab 
Commission upon the filing of an application, as 
provided in Section 34:1-4 of these Revised 
General Ordinances, and upon payment of a 
transfer fee of five hundred ($500.00) dollars and 
in the case of a transfer to a corporation, a copy 
of the certificate of incorporation issued by the 
State of New Jersey and the name of its 
registered agent shall also be filed; provided that 
if a corporation wishes to transfer a taxicab 
license to another corporation to be used in a 
bona fide operation of a taxicab business, and not 
less than seventy-five (75%) ownership of each 
corporation rests with the same person or group 
of persons, then upon application and upon filing 
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restrictions on the transfer of licenses,6 and (4) limiting the 
number of licenses issued to 600.7  The plaintiffs argue that these 
provisions constitute a promise of exclusivity to taxi operators 
that the City breached by permitting TNCs to operate within 
Newark.  But these provisions do not “use[] terminology that 
plainly expresse[s] [the City’s] intent to create contractual 
rights.”  Id.  In the absence of such express language creating 
contractual rights, the Newark Ordinances do not create a 
contract under New Jersey law.  Id. 
 
2. 
 
We turn to the plaintiff’s claims for promissory and 
equitable estoppel.  The elements of promissory estoppel under 
New Jersey law are:  “1) a clear and definite promise, 2) made 
with the expectation that the promisee will rely upon it, 
3) reasonable reliance upon the promise, 4) which results in 
definite and substantial detriment.”  E. Orange Bd. of Educ. v. 
                                              
of a certificate of incorporation issued by the 
State of New Jersey and the name of its 
registered agent, and the consent of the Manager 
upon recommendation of the Commission, and 
upon payment of an administrative fee of one 
hundred ($100.00) dollars, the license shall be 
transferred.  No transfer may be made during the 
month of November. 
 
6 See id. 
 
7 Newark Ordinances § 34:1-5(c) provides that “[t]he 
number of licenses issued and in use in the City at any one 
time shall not exceed six hundred (600).” 
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N.J. Sch. Const. Corp., 963 A.2d 865, 875 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2009) (quoting Lobiondo v. O’Callaghan, 815 A.2d 
1013, 1020 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)).  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has held that “to establish equitable estoppel, 
plaintiffs must show that defendant engaged in conduct, either 
intentionally or under circumstances that induced reliance, and 
that plaintiffs acted or changed their position to their 
detriment.”  Id. at 873 (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 836 A.2d 794, 
799 (N.J. 2003)).   
 
We are not persuaded that the plaintiffs’ have stated 
promissory or equitable estoppel claims.  The plaintiffs argue 
that the City’s regulations promised taxi license holders that if 
they complied with the regulations then the City would provide 
them with certain rights including exclusivity, market support, 
and enforcement of the regulations.  The Newark Ordinances, 
however, do not contain a “clear and definite promise” by the 
City that it would guarantee the plaintiffs any of these rights.  
Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 148 A.3d 
767, 778 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).  The plaintiffs have thus 
failed to meet this essential element of a promissory estoppel 
claim.  This absence of any clear promise on the part of the City 
also dooms the equitable estoppel claim.   
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court. 
 
